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Towards reasonably priced microcredit: 
analysing Egyptian NGO-MFIs’ cost 
structure and financial performance
AMR KHAFAGY
Interest rates have always been a much debated topic in microfinance, as the prices 
paid by low-income clients tend to be higher than conventional banks’ rates. In Egypt, 
microcredit rates are increasingly being criticized and viewed as unreasonably high. The 
study analyses the effective interest rates charged by Egyptian NGO-MFIs 
compared with commercial banks’ rates, and using time series cross-sectional 
regression models, the study examines the main determinants affecting NGO-MFIs’ 
portfolio yield and operating expenses in order to identify prospects for providing 
reasonably priced credit for low-income Egyptians. Findings suggest that, as the 
average portfolio yield for NGO-MFIs in Egypt has exceeded the global average 
portfolio yield, there is a clear potential for providing microcredit at lower prices, and 
much can still be done towards more operational efficiency.
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   The most debated topic in microcredit has always been interest rates, as the prices 
paid by low-income clients tend to be higher than conventional banks’ rates, and may 
exceed 100 per cent effective annual rates for some global MFIs. In Egypt, 
microcredit rates are increasingly being criticized on moral standards, and viewed as 
unreasonably high. At least once a year, you can find an article in an Egyptian 
newspaper urging for the creation of ‘a bank for the poor’. Driven by religious 
perspectives and a long history of subsidized policies, the longing for ‘a bank for the 
poor’ in Egypt is always spinning around the idea of providing credit to low-income 
households ‘without interest rates or collaterals’. 
   Interest should be seen as the price of an ordinary and important service, and the 
unpleasant news, which everyone already knows, is that there has never been, nor 
will be, sustainable cost-free lending, and yet the debate in Egypt continues. In their 
book, Portfolios of the Poor, Collins et al. (2009) explain that, ‘interest rates may often 
be better understood as fees for a service than a rate for the use of money for a 
specific period’. Well, demands in Egypt for no-cost loans distract our attention from 
what should really be done: ‘attention should be focused on how to reduce costs per 
client’ (Mersland and Strom, 2010). Thus, the question of what determines 
microcredit interest rates in Egypt becomes increasingly important. This study tries to 
analyse effective interest rates charged by microcredit providers in Egypt, key factors 
that determine these rates, and prospects to provide reasonably priced credit for low-
income Egyptians. 
Why do the poor pay more?
  Setting the appropriate rate is not an easy decision. For MFIs to continually 
provide financial services for financially excluded populations they must impose 
sufficiently high interest rates to cover their high expenses. However, extremely 
high interest rates would increase the default risk by attracting high-risk clients 
(Waweru et al., 2011). Supporters of commercial microcredit claim that clients are 
more concerned with their ability to access finance rather than how much it costs 
them. Porteous (2006) explains that what really matters is the loan size, type of 
loan, and disbursement timing and procedures. This claim is usually supported by 
steady demand for microcredit regardless of the charged rates and the common 
presumption about high returns on capital for microenterprises.
   Gobezie (2004) and Cull et al. (2007) estimate a high rate of return on invested 
capital for those with low capital and who are facing capital constraints. Therefore, poor 
households would still maintain sufficient revenues even if they are paying high 
interest rates. Goldstein and Udry (1999) and Bidwell (2009) found similar results 
for small-scale farmers. In contrast, many studies observed clear evidence for price 
elasticity of demand for credit among microcredit borrowers compared with 
wealthier borrowers (Dehejia et al., 2005; Karlan and Zinman, 2008;  Annim, 
2011). 
   Hashemi and Rosenberg (2006) explain that high microcredit rates are rational, 
associated with high risks, lack of guarantees, and the challenges of continually 
providing non-financial services. While, according to Morduch (2000), high rates are 
caused by high inelastic demand for credit among populations where financial services 
are limited. On the basis of cost per unit, creating and collecting tiny loans is extremely 
costly. It should not be surprising that institutions which claim to be serving low-
income populations are imposing much higher prices than those profitable 
institutions targeting richer clients. The reason for that is the adminis-trative costs, 
which are clearly higher for tiny loans compared with other commercial banks’ loans 
(Rosenberg et al., 2009). 
   According to Rosenberg et al. (2009, 2013), there are four main factors which 
determine MFIs’ interest rates: cost of funds, loan loss expenses, operating expenses, 
and profits. Moreover, Rosenberg et al. (2013) have found that the average global 
nominal interest yield for microcredit providers has dropped by 2.7 per cent, to 
around 27 per cent in 2011, compared with around 30 per cent in 2004, taking into 
consideration that global nominal interest yield has not recorded any significant 
decrease during the period from 2007 to 2011. Such a drop in the average global 
interest yield was associated with the decline of MFIs’ operating expenses and net 
operating profits. While on the other hand, the global market witnessed an increase in 
both cost of funds and loan loss expenses for the same period. The study showed 
that the nominal interest yield for the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region has 
slightly declined from 30 per cent in 2004 to around 26 per cent, taking into account 
that the MENA market has experienced the same global trend of increasing interest 
rates during the period from 2007 to 2011.
Interest rate ceilings
   A need for legal regulations to protect the poor from MFIs’ abuse was recommended 
by many observers, as poor people who might be illiterate and have no shield from 
profit-seeking MFIs should be protected. The main aim of interest rate ceilings is 
client protection against exploitation of low-income households who are more 
exposed to excessively high rates for credit. These ceilings often include both 
consumer and business borrowers in the scope of their protection. But whether an 
interest rate ceiling is the ideal resolution or not is disputed. Paul (2010) argued that 
usury laws address the end symptom and not the root of the problem, as regulations 
have rarely focused on the main driver for high microcredit interest rates which is 
operating costs. Others suggest that interest rate ceilings are in fact harming those 
who are supposed to be protected by such laws – the borrowers – as usury laws drive 
financial institutions to exclude clients with the highest credit risk (Jansson and 
Wenner, 1997). Also, rate ceilings may encourage MFIs to impose hidden fees; this 
decreases their transparency and most customers do not realize that these fees are 
part of the loan cost (Helms and Reille, 2004; Policis, 2004; Paul, 2010; Campion et al., 
2010).
   In addition, interest rate ceilings may push many MFIs out of the market since they 
are struggling to cover the costs of their operations. Furthermore, many studies have 
claimed that the growth of the microfinance industry is stifled by interest rate 
ceilings, as MFIs tend to shift their focus from lending to the poorer clientele in 
remote areas to a more urban clientele that is less costly to cover, and through 
increasing their average loan size (Helms and Reille, 2004; Acclassato, 2006; King, 
2008; Payne and Skinner, 2010). Also, constraints on microloan prices harm  
MFIs’ financial sustainability (Wright and Alamgir, 2004; Jenkins, 2006; Waweru et 
al., 2011).
   Nevertheless Wright and Alamgir (2004) claim that if a reasonable interest cap was 
enforced, MFIs would be encouraged towards improving their operating expenses. 
Reasonable or even variable ceilings on interest rates, which should not be extremely 
and unrealistically low, could be quite effective, especially in undeveloped markets 
where little competition is found.
Microcredit industry in Egypt
Egypt is the largest market in the MENA region in terms of outreach, and the second 
after Morocco in terms of total outstanding portfolio. The number of active clients has 
steadily increased over the period from 2005 to 2009, with a five year average growth 
rate of 28.44 per cent, and more than 46 per cent growth rate in 2007 (Sanabel, 2010). 
According to the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA, 2010), by 
the end of 2009, more than 400 institutions were providing microcredit services to a total 
of 1.4 million active borrowers, 50 per cent of whom are women. Moreover, 49 per cent 
of active borrowers were found in Upper Egypt, followed by the Lower Egypt region with 
36 per cent. EFSA estimates the total outstanding portfolio of Egyptian microcredit 
institutions to exceed EGP2.2 bn (US$319 m).
   Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and community development associa-tions 
(CDAs) are the main microcredit providers, accounting for 83 per cent of the total 
number of active borrowers and 68 per cent of total outstanding portfolio by the end of 
2009. However, there is no legal definition or any regulatory framework for 
microfinance services in Egypt, though a draft microfinance law was prepared by EFSA 
in 2010 and is still waiting for legislators’ approval. The proposed legislation 
addresses microfinance providers as only-for-profit firms/institutions. Under this draft 
law, the Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority will be the responsible regulator 
and supervisor of MFIs, and it is not clear whether the new legislation will allow other 
entities to continue providing microfinance services or not.
   Most current microcredit products apply short repayment periods without any 
grace period. Accordingly, 71 per cent of the current served clients are operating in 
the trade sector, followed by the service sector with 20 per cent. Moreover, two main 
lending methods are adopted by MFIs in Egypt, individual and solidarity group 
lending methods. Solidarity group lending applies weekly repayments with an annual 
interest rate ranging from 24 per cent to 28 per cent, while individual lending, usually 
provided to finance micro-entrepreneurs’ working capital, applies monthly repayments 
and an annual interest rate ranging from 13.5 per cent to  16 per cent. 
   On the demand side, it is relatively difficult to predict the actual demand for 
microcredit services in Egypt; however, it is noticeable that the level of outreach is still 
low. Many Egyptian villages lack access to any formal financial services or are served 
by monopolistic NGO-MFIs. 
   Despite the present unclear political and economic conditions, a platform has 
recently been developed by the Egyptian Micro-Finance Network (EMFN), 
integrating NGOs into the I-SCORE credit bureau system. Upon the success of the 
platform, the data of more than 70 per cent of Egypt’s microcredit borrowers will be 
included in the I-SCORE, and EMFN’s members will be allowed to investigate their 
potential clients at a reasonable price. The potential accessibility to a credit bureau will 
open the gate for more operational efficiency.
Microcredit vs. commercial banks’ interest rates
   In an economy characterized by a relatively high year-to-year inflation rate, the  path 
for obtaining low prices for microloans is not straightforward. Like many 
developing economies, the five year average consumer price index (CPI) for 2007 
to 2011 was 12.2 per cent, and 9.75 per cent by the end of June 2012.  Based 
on the Egyptian Central Bank’s (CBE) overnight deposit rate, the average interest 
rate  during 1991 to 2013 is 11.67 per cent, reaching its peak of 21.40 per cent in 
October 1991 and the lowest rate of 8.25 per  cent in  September 2009.  Treasury bills 
were issued with 17 per 
cent rate of return during 2012, while CBE’s discount rate recorded an average of 9.2 per 
cent during the last five years; by the end of 2012, the yearly weighted average 
interest rate for commercial banks was 12.2 per cent. Clearly, high interest rates are 
not only a microcredit phenomenon in the Egyptian economy; in fact, microcredit rates 
are close to those charged on credit cards and consumer loans, which in many cases 
can exceed 2 per cent per month (Rosenberg et al., 2009). 
   In this study, five year financial statements for six major commercial banks were 
compared with the largest eight NGO-MFIs operating in Egypt, representing the 
period from 2007 to 2011, in order to study profitability and portfolio yield of the 
Egyptian microfinance sector compared with the commercial banking sector. NGO-
MFIs’ portfolio yield was measured as the total financial income from loans weighted 
by the average gross outstanding loan portfolio, while commercial banks’ yield was 
calculated as only the interest income from consumer loans weighted  by the 
average net outstanding loan portfolio for consumers (excluding treasury bills 
outstanding portfolio and its returns). This can paint a picture of the real prices 
paid by low-income clients compared with upper and middle class lending prices. 
Unsurprisingly, results reported unpleasant news for low-income clients, with a huge 
disparity in the average portfolio yield of commercial banks for five years, which 
recorded 13.92 per cent, compared with 31.48 per cent recorded by NGO-MFIs for the 
same period (see Figure 1). 
   Similar to Rosenberg et al.’s (2013) findings, Figure 2 shows that Egyptian 
NGO-MFIs’ average return on assets is somewhat higher than commercial banks, 
though the average return on equity is much less than commercial banks. The 
five year average return on assets was 5.22 per cent for the examined NGO-MFIs 
compared with only 1.48 per cent for commercial banks, while in contrast, 
commercial banks’ average return on equity was 17.6 per cent compared with  
7.14 per cent for NGO-MFIs.
Figure 1 NGO-MFIs’ vs. commercial banks’ portfolio yield
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Figure 2 NGO-MFIs’ vs. commercial banks’ return on average total assets (ROAA) and return on 
average total equity (ROAE)
Research design and methodology
Research objective
   The main purpose of the study is to analyse effective interest rates charged by 
microcredit providers in Egypt, and the key factors that drive these rates. For large 
institutions, the research here will examine a number of the main drivers of microfi-nance 
interest rates mentioned in the literature review; namely, operational efficiency (in terms of 
personnel and administrative expenses), portfolio quality, NGO-MFIs’ age in years, profit 
margin, average loan size, scale of the institution (in terms of total number of active 
borrowers), percentage of total borrowers who are women, and the cost of funds. While 
for NGO-MFIs funded from the Social Fund for Development, the study will only 
examine the operational efficiency, portfolio quality, profit margin, average loan size, 
total number of active borrowers, and the cost of funds. Furthermore, the study hopes 
to develop recommendations for discussions and policy dialogue, to assist in 
strengthening and developing better policies and initiatives for the microfinance industry 
in Egypt.
Research questions
The study addresses the following main questions with respect to microcredit 
interest rates in Egypt:
The sample
   In the attempt to study the effective interest rates charged by Egyptian microcredit 
providers, the research used primary data to analyse the financial and operational 
performance of 42 NGO-MFIs operating in the Egyptian market. The data of 11 
NGO-MFIs were collected from the Microfinance Information Exchange, MIX 
Market; as few Egyptian NGO-MFIs regularly report data to the MIX market, data for the 
other 31 NGO-MFIs were collected from available audited financial statements 
submitted to the Social Fund for Development, Egypt (SFD). 
   As shown in Table 1, NGO-MFIs in the sample were divided into two tiers based on 
their operational size and their gross loan portfolio. First tier NGO-MFIs in the study hold 
more than 60 per cent of the total amount of microcredit portfolio in Egypt, in terms of 
outreach and outstanding portfolio. The five year average loan portfolio of a first tier 
NGO-MFI is more than EGP15 m ($2 m) and the average number of active borrowers 
is above 7,000 clients. Data for first tier NGO-MFIs cover the period from 2007 to 2011, 
while as the SFD’s funding requirement is the submission of only three years’ 
financial statements, data for second tier NGO-MFIs cover only the period from 2009 to 
2011.
  The selection of second tier NGO-MFIs included in the study was based on data 
availability and quality of the financial statements. Moreover, SFD’s monitoring and 
evaluation reports were used to assume NGO-MFIs’ ‘average loan size’ and ‘number of 
active borrowers’.
Table 1 Sample description
First tier Second tier Total
Average gross loan portfolio (in EGP ’000s) > 15,000 <15,000 –
Average no. of active borrowers > 7,000 < 7,000 –
Years in observation 2007–2011 2009–2011 –
No. of NGO-MFIs 13 29 42
No. of observations 65 87 152
By the end of 2009, the total gross loan portfolio for microcredit in Egypt was around 
EGP2.06 bn ($375.06 m), according to Sanabel’s 2009 Industry Survey, and EGP2.18 
bn ($397.82 m), according to the 2010 Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority report. 
Table 2 shows that, with a market outreach of 1.4 billion or 1.5 billion according to 
Sanabel and EFSA, respectively, the NGO-MFIs included in our study represent more 
than 60 per cent of the total gross loan portfolio and more than 75 per cent of total 
active borrowers of Egypt’s microcredit market, as of year-end 2009.
Table 2 Sample size vs. total market outreach
Sanabel EFSA First tier Second tier
GLP (in EGP) 2,055,218,637 2,179,951,794 1,287,875,829 59,366,482
Total active borrowers 1,424,860 1,502,507 1,126,349 NA
Research design
The study compared the actual portfolio yield of the examined NGO-MFIs and the 
effective interest rates which should be applied according to the ‘Pricing Formula’ 
suggested by CGAP (2002) as the best pricing practice for microfinance institutions. 
According to CGAP (2002), the annualized effective interest rate (R) charged on 
loans will be a function of five elements, each expressed as a percentage of average 
outstanding loan portfolio, as follows: administrative expenses (AE), loan losses (LL), the 
cost of funds (CF), the desired capitalization rate (K), and investment income (II):
R = 
ae LL cF K ii
LL
+ + + −
−1
Finally, the drivers of interest rates were analysed using two different time series 
cross-sectional regression models (TSCS), in order to examine the main factors 
affecting the portfolio yield and the operating expenses. The models, as suggested by 
Campion et al. (2010), were proposed to examine the research’s main questions. In the 
first model, the portfolio yield is the dependent variable while independent variables will 
be as follows: personnel expense ratio (personnel expenses weighted by average 
gross loan portfolio), administration costs weighted by average gross loan portfolio, 
profit margin, cost of funds, average loan size, total number of active borrowers, 
impairment loss allowance weighted by average gross loan portfolio, percentage of 
total borrowers who are women, and NGO-MFI’s age in years. 
portfolio yieldt
= b0 + b1 (personal expense ratio)t + b2 (administrative costs ration)t
+ b3 (profit margin)t + b4 (cost of funds)t + b5 (average loan size)t
+ b6 (no. of borrowers)t + b7 (impairment loss allowance)t
+ b8 (female clients)t + b9 (age)t + ∈
In the second model, the operating expense ratio is the dependent variable, while 
independent variables will be as follows: administrative costs ratio, OSS (financial 
revenue/(financial expense + loan loss provision expense + operating expense)), 
profit margin, average loan size, total number of active borrowers, impairment loss 
allowance weighted by average gross loan portfolio, percentage of total borrowers 
who are women, and NGO-MFI’s age in years. 
Operating expense ratiot
= b0 + b1 (administrative costs ratio)t + b2 (oss)t + b3 (profit margin)t
+ b4 (average loan size)t + b5 (No. of borrowers)t
+ b6 (impairment loss allowance)t + b7 (female clients)t + b8 (age)t + ∈
     As for second tier NGO-MFIs, the drivers of interest rates shall be analysed using 
the same regression models excluding impairment loss allowance, percentage of 
total borrowers who are women, and NGO-MFI’s age in years, due to data availability. As 
one of the main assumptions that the ordinary least squares (OLS) model relies on is that 
all errors across units and time periods are homogeneous, having the same variance,
and  are independent  of each  other,  accordingly,  OLS  would  not  be  a  good 
predictor for a time series cross-sectional analysis. Moreover, the presence of autocor-
relation disturbs the (OLS) assumption that the error terms are uncorrelated, which can 
lead to statistically biased or inefficient estimations. On the other hand, multicol-linearity 
remains unsolved in GLS (generalized least squares) estimation. For these reasons, 
the above-mentioned equations are estimated using feasible generalized least squares 
(FGLS) estimation. FGLS allows estimation in the presence of autocorrelation within 
panels and heteroskedastic error structures across panels (Podestà, 2002).
Study limitations
Two main limitations in the research were recognized. The first limitation was the 
quality of financial data collected, as several financial statements in the study 
presented clear lack of transparency in financial reporting, especially for small and 
medium scale NGO-MFIs. In this respect, The Economist’s Global Microscope index 
for 2012 (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2012) lowered Egypt’s year-to-year ranking 
from 42nd to 50th due to the decline in both accounting and pricing transparencies. The 
Economist’s index reported that, as there is no legal commitment for NGO-MFIs to 
publicly reveal their interest rates or fees, most NGO-MFIs are not transparent in 
informing clients of the full cost of their loans. In the study, few financial statements were 
in compliance with microfinance international accounting principles, and NGO-MFIs 
who follow the industry’s standards are doing so voluntarily. Secondly, portfolio yield is 
used in the study as a measurement for an MFI’s average effective interest rate. 
Portfolio yield includes interest and fees received by an MFI on a portfolio weighted by 
its two year average gross portfolio. Although the portfolio yield gives a clear picture of 
an MFI’s earnings from loans, it does not fairly show what microcredit borrowers are 
really paying. Many Egyptian MFIs impose compulsory savings on their clients, in which 
they do not disburse the full amount of loan to their borrowers while maintaining a 
percentage of the loan as a deposit, though interest rates charged on borrowers are 
still calculated on the full loan amount. Such practices raise the effective interest rates, 
as compulsory savings cut the net loan disbursed, which the borrower actually 
receives, making the actual amount of interest paid by a borrower exceed the rate 
declared by an MFI. According to Rosenberg et al. (2013), around a third of total 
microcredit borrowers worldwide in 2011 were served by MFIs that impose compulsory 
savings.
Another limitation on interest yield is that it measures the financial returns of an MFI 
weighted by its entire gross portfolio, while in fact an MFI’s total gross portfolio might 
include several types of credit products, which might vary in their terms and prices. 
Also, the total gross loan portfolio includes, besides active loans, loans which are 
delinquent and have neither been repaid nor written off. A better measurement for the 
true price paid by microcredit borrowers is the annual percentage rate (APR) on a 
borrower’s particular loan. APR is usually higher than the stated interest rate, as it 
considers the loan’s total sum of cash flows and their timing, including interest, principal, 
and any other fees or charges, including compulsory deposits. Maintaining these data is 
certainly difficult in the present time, which restricts the use of APR as a proxy for 
microcredit price. The gathering of these data is labour-intensive and 
relies heavily on the voluntary cooperation of MFIs to share the fees and charges which 
they actually impose on every loan product (Rosenberg et al., 2013). 
Results and interpretations
NGO-MFIs’ portfolio yield and cost structure
Rosenberg et al. (2013) show a drop in the global average interest yield for the period 
from 2004 to 2007, but not afterward, reaching a global average of 27 per cent, and 26 
per cent for the MENA region in 2011. In contrast, Figure 3 shows a clear uptrend for 
Egyptian NGO-MFIs’ portfolio yield, especially in the last three years. By the end of 
2011, average portfolio yield for first tier NGO-MFIs had reached 33.2 per cent 
compared with an average portfolio yield of 25.3 per cent in 2006, while average 
portfolio yield for the second tier NGO-MFIs in our sample increased by only 1 per cent 
during the period from 2009 to 2011, reaching 23.6 per cent in 2011 compared with 22.6 
per cent in 2009. 
Such an increase in the average portfolio yield was derived by the increase in 
operating expenses (personnel expenses and administrative costs). As Figure 4 
displays, except for profit margin and cost of funds, all other effective factors have 
recorded noticeable increases especially during 2011. While Rosenberg et al. (2009) 
suggest that average loan losses as a percentage of gross loan portfolio has a fairly 
low effect on MFIs’ cost structure compared with other factors, first tier NGO-MFIs’ 
findings indicate that the most obvious increase which occurred was in the rate of 
provision for loan loss expenses, which increased suddenly during 2011, reaching an 
average of 3.1 per cent for first tier MFIs, compared with less than 1 per cent in the 
preceding four years. The robust increase in the rate of provision for loan loss 
expenses is compatible with results reported by both Sanabel and MIX Market in the 
‘2011 Middle East and North Africa Regional Snapshot’ released in 2012. Sanabel 
and MIX Market (2012) found that portfolio at risk (PAR) for some MFIs in Egypt 
floated around 20 per cent, suggesting that a high level of PAR during 2011 is a 
direct result of the political and social instability formed after the uprising at the 
beginning of the year.
Figure 3 NGO-MFIs’ average portfolio yield
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In the basic pricing calculations, the yearly discount rate reported by the Central Bank 
of Egypt (CBE) is used as the desired capitalization rate, assuming that the 
minimum required rate of return should at least meet with the annual discount rate, 
in order to avoid de-capitalization of the business. In Figure 5, throughout the period 
from 2006 to 2011, the average portfolio yield for first tier MFIs lay below our 
suggested effective interest rate. Moreover, by 2011, average portfolio yield was nearly 
equal to the suggested effective interest rate with zero required rate of return. Figure 5 
shows that regarding all debates about the acceptable level of interest rates, first tier 
MFIs were unable to impose sufficient prices to cover their expenses in addition to 
the inflation rate. Meaning, that however high growth rates had been recorded by 
Egyptian MFIs, most of them are facing gradual de-capitalization caused by high 
inflation rates experienced by the whole economy. Fernando (2006) 
Figure 4 NGO-MFIs’ costs and profits as a percentage of gross loan portfolio
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highlights the effect of inflation on interest rates, arguing that high inflation rates 
reduce the real value of equity, and may push MFIs to increase their interests to 
avoid de-capitalization.
Figure 6 shows the results from the basic pricing calculations for the second tier 
NGO-MFIs, indicating that applied interest rates in 2009, 2010 and 2011 for second tier 
NGO-MFIs were adequate to recover all their expenses, with enough profits to cover 
inflation effects. 
Table 3 Results of regressions explaining portfolio yield
Multiple regressions Simple regressions
Estimated coefficient
Independent variable First tier Second tier First tier Second tier
OER – – 0.325*** 0.867***
Personnel 1.114*** 0.826*** 0.430** 0.982***
Administrative costs 1.258*** 1.098*** 0.608** 0.633***
Profit margin 0.323*** 0.063*** 0.075*** 0.062***
Cost of fund 0.562*** 0.832*** 0.383*** 0.700***
Avg. loan size 0.000 0.000 –0.000*** 0.000
No. of active borrowers 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000***
Impairment loss allowance 0.165* – –0.499*** –
Women active borrowers 0.050*** – 0.072* –
MFI’s age –0.001*** – –0.001*** –
Observations 65 87 65 87
Note: The dependent variable is portfolio yield. Asterisks indicate statistical signiﬁcance at the 
*10%, **5%, and ***1% level; no asterisk means the coefﬁcient is not statistically signiﬁcantly 
different from zero.
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Regression analyses
   Generally, key findings from the regression analyses shown in Tables 3 and 4 
highlight the robust role of operation expense, cost of fund, profit margin, and 
impairment loan loss allowance in shaping NGO-MFIs’ portfolio yield. High, statis-tically 
significant, positive correlation coefficients were found for these variables compared 
with very low or no statistically significant correlation with percentage of active female 
clients, average loan size, economies of scale, and age of NGO-MFI. As a labour-
intensive industry, personnel expenses remain a leading determinant for portfolio yield 
and operating expenses, though, regression results suggest that administrative costs 
are found to have the highest positive correlation coefficients with both portfolio yield 
and operating expense ratio, compared with all other variables used, especially for 
first tier NGO-MFIs. For every 1 per cent increase in the administrative costs, 
portfolio yield is expected to increase by 1.26 per cent and 1.1 per cent, and OER 
would increase by 1.85 per cent and 1.36 per cent, for first and second tier NGO-
MFIs, respectively. Administrative costs are mainly rent expenses, utilities, transport 
costs, and monitoring expenses, which impose huge pressure on NGO-MFIs’ 
operational effectiveness. According to Sanabel (2010), Egypt maintained the 
lowest administrative cost in the MENA region for 2009, with an average of 2 per cent.
As a labour-intensive industry, high personnel expenses impose a significant 
burden on MFIs’ operations; findings suggest a strongly significant positive relation 
between personnel expense and portfolio yield, for both first and second tier 
NGO-MFIs. It is worth mentioning that Sanabel (2010) found that, with an average 
Table 4 Results of regressions explaining operating expense ratio
Multiple regressions Simple regressions
Estimated coefficient
Independent variable First tier Second tier First tier Second tier
Personnel – – 1.294*** 1.119***
Administrative costs 1.845*** 1.360*** 1.890*** 1.103***
OSS –0.047*** –0.012*** –0.054*** –0.009**
Profit margin 0.062** 0.009** –0.139*** 0.004*
Avg. loan size 0.000 –0.000 –0.000 0.000*
No. of active borrowers 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000
Impairment loss allowance 0.393*** – 0.420*** –
Women active borrowers 0.037* – 0.091** –
MFI’s age 0.001** – –0.000 –
Observations 65 87 65 87
Note: The dependent variable is operating expense ratio. Asterisks indicate statistical significance 
at the *10 per cent, **5 per cent, and ***1 per cent level; no asterisk means the coefficient is not 
statistically significantly different from zero
of 268 clients per loan officer, Egypt maintained the second highest level of produc-tivity 
in the MENA region in 2009.
Moreover, results suggest a strong, significant, positive correlation between cost of 
funds and portfolio yield, especially for second tier NGO-MFIs. Findings suggest that 
with every 1 per cent increase in cost of fund, an increment of 0.56 per cent and 0.83 
per cent in portfolio yield would probably occur for first and second tier NGO-MFIs, 
respectively.
   General mainstream opinion agrees that MFIs should attempt to at least break 
even; however, arguments would vary on the acceptable level of profit (Campion et al., 
2010). Rosenberg et al. (2009) indicate that a reduction in MFIs’ profit margin would 
not have the expected significant reduction on the charged interest rates, as an MFI 
could decrease its interest rate by only 17 per cent of its existing imposed interest 
rate. Meaning that even with zero profit margin required, most MFIs would still 
charge interest rates and might reduce their rates by only 0.17 per cent. Gaul (2011) 
indicated that MFIs in the MENA region are considered among the most profitable 
MFIs. Sanabel (2010) noticed that Egyptian MFIs’ profitability has improved 
remarkably during the period from 2007 to 2009, with average return on assets of 7.5 
per cent in 2009, compared with 4.9 per cent in 2007, which is higher than the 3.4 per 
cent regional average return on assets in 2009.
   The regression analyses again support the hypothesis that, although net profit is one 
of the main determinants in portfolio yield structure, it is not the lead factor for NGO-
MFIs’ high interest rates, as for every 1 per cent increase in net profit margin, portfolio 
yield would increase by only 0.3 per cent and 0.06 per cent for first and second tier 
NGO-MFIs, respectively.
   As the rate of nonperforming loans increases with its associated provisions, MFIs’ 
profit margin would decline. Findings support the hypothesis that if impairment loan 
losses are high, an MFI might tend to impose higher rates on its clients to obtain 
the same expected profit margin.
   On the other hand, the research results did not find strong evidence for the 
hypothesis that MFIs which have greater focus on serving more female clients tend to 
have higher interest rates and operational costs, as the findings suggest very weak 
statistically significant positive correlation between percentage of active female 
clients and both portfolio yield and operating expense ratio. 
    Many studies suggest that small loans are expected to carry higher interest rates 
and operational costs than larger ones, though, results from the regression analyses 
found no correlation between NGO-MFIs’ average loan size and both portfolio 
yield and OER. In addition, while general concepts suggest that increasing outreach 
should allow MFIs to divide their fixed operating costs over more borrowers resulting in 
lower cost per loan, again, the regression analyses show very small or no statis-tically 
significant correlation between the number of active borrowers and both portfolio 
yield and OER for first and second tier NGO-MFIs. Similarly, results do not support the 
assumption that older MFIs should operate more efficiently than new ones, as the 
multiple and simple regression analyses found very slight impact for institutions’ age 
on MFIs’ efficiency. 
Conclusion
   Clearly, the road for providing reasonably priced credit for low-income Egyptians is 
a bumpy one, yet not impossible to ride. Although interest rates charged by 
Egyptian NGO-MFIs might seem quite similar to microcredit rates charged by MFIs all 
over the world, there is a clear potential for providing credit at lower prices, and much 
can still be done.
   To start with, the expected availability of credit bureaux will open the gate for 
NGO-MFIs to greater operational efficiency. On the one hand, given the suggested 
correlation in our findings between impairment loan loss and both portfolio yield and 
operating expense ratio, access to credit bureaux will be very important for NGO-
MFIs to improve their portfolio quality, in order to keep their operating expense at 
sustainable levels. In addition, as our results support the significant role of personnel 
and administrative expenses in both portfolio yield and operating expense ratio, 
credit bureaux will ease the borrower screening process and assist MFIs in 
collecting their loans, allowing a potential decrease in transportation costs and 
monitoring expenses. Loan collection is usually done by field officers who are entitled 
to visit their clients; sometimes even regular visits are required for effective monitoring 
of borrowers’ businesses, an operation which costs MFIs both money and time. 
   Unfortunately, as the findings highlighted the significant correlation between MFIs’ 
portfolio yield and cost of funds, high interest rates charged by commercial banks will 
remain a significant constraint for any potential expansion in the market. Therefore, while 
it is still difficult for NGOs-MFIs to acquire funds from commercial banks in the first place, 
and with the lack of any regulation allowing them to mobilize deposits, we can expect that 
subsidized loans from donor agencies will remain the most reliable source of funds, 
especially for small and medium NGO-MFIs. 
   The fear of allowing for-profit entities to provide financial services seems quite 
unreasonable, especially with such existing high profitability rates attained by most 
NGO-MFIs. High profitability rates recorded in this study and others, together with the 
lack of competition in the market, raise our attention again to the need for effective 
microfinance legislation. A trustworthy regulatory framework can boost competition 
and outreach by allowing other entities to provide microfinance services. In 
particular, the results support claims that, though microcredit providers are not-for-profit 
institutions, many large NGO-MFIs set high salaries for their board and top management 
compared with small NGO-MFIs. In other words, owners and members of not-for-profit 
organizations can and do benefit from the profitability of their institutions, without any 
reliable legal constraints. In addition, the noticeable low level of outreach strengthens 
the call for new interventions, as many Egyptian villages lack access to any formal 
credit services, or are served by monopolistic NGO-MFIs. Therefore, well-structured 
legislation, alongside a practical and reliable ceiling on interest rates may enhance 
the level of outreach in the market, and drive financial services providers to adopt 
more efficient and transparent practices, especially in undeveloped markets where 
low levels of competition and outreach are found. Nevertheless, we can expect that, 
with the existence of an efficient credit 
bureau system, competition too may force MFIs to reduce their profits and improve their 
internal efficiency.
   The need for new legislation addressing microcredit accounting standards is also 
vital for transparent auditing on portfolio quality indicators and transaction records. 
Meanwhile, personnel expenses, administrative costs, and profit margins reported will 
remain distorted. 
   Finally, many other factors that affect interest rates in Egypt are essentially macro-
economic factors, including political and economic instability, high inflation rates, huge 
budget deficit (usually funded by T-Bills), weak physical infrastructure, weak business 
environment, and other factors. Considering the current low economic growth rates 
together with the absence of clear economic policy, something that hinders potential 
market growth, besides the existing inadequate road networks and transportation in 
slums and rural areas where targeted clientele are concen-trated, we can expect that 
any improvements at the macroeconomic level and in the physical infrastructure would 
promote more operational efficiency and help in reducing microcredit interest rates.
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